Quilliam chairman and co-founder Maajid Nawaz, writing for War on the Rocks, explores what factors have hitherto made Islamist movements more effecting as political forces in the Middle East than their liberal, pro-democracy counterparts.
Few could disagree that the Arab uprisings that first began to sweep across the Middle East and North Africa region at the end of 2010 have been hijacked. The surge of democratic participation and opposition to authoritarianism was forced from liberal, pluralist values, and towards Islamism and, in Egypt’s case, back to despotism. Certainly, there was a time when democracy did seem to be taking root in earnest, but as I noted at the time, an important opportunity was missed by both the West and pro-democracy activists in the region. The secular and liberal youth movements that came together to push octogenarian dictators from power hit a wall in the vacuum that followed. They were, whether we like it or not, ill-equipped to maintain their previously awesome momentum and, structurally, far surpassed by Islamist groups, both moderate and extremist, from Tunisia to Syria.
That this has happened should not come as a surprise. Indeed, when Egypt, for example, was still in the throes of post-revolutionary fervor, it rapidly became clear among the components of the anti-state coalition that it was the Islamists who were much better placed to take political power than any other group. History is forever repeating itself. Indeed, looking back, long before the so-called “Arab Spring,” a similar thing happened in 1979 in Iran when a broad coalition of Iranian civil society successfully worked together to oust the Shah, only for its pursuits to be co-opted by a minority of extremist Islamists, the heirs of whom are still wreaking havoc on the Iranian state right now. If we are not careful, the same will happen with the rest of the Middle East, perhaps even worse.
In order to try to ensure that it doesn’t, we need to first come to grips with what makes Islamism so much more enticing to subjects of post-revolution power vacuums than liberal democracy. As a former adherent of an extremist Islamist ideology myself, I have personal experience with what it is that draws people to the likes of Islamic State (IS); what it is that renders a group that crucifies its opponents more attractive than one that seeks to challenge them peacefully.
Put simply, it comes down to five structural distinctions that make Islamist movements so potent in ways that their secular, liberal competitors are not. When combined, these tools create Islamism, this blatant manipulation of religion, an attractive ideology that will almost inevitably supersede the appeal of its secular, liberal rivals.
What are they, then? First, it is the basis of their political motivations, the idea that drives them: Islamism. Here, I am referring to the desire and perceived imperative to enforce a version of Sharia as law.
This idea is then reinforced by the next tool: narratives. After all, every idea must be backed up by a series of narratives that confirm its legitimacy. The most often touted narrative that Islamists cling to — regardless of their creed — is that there is a war against Islam, and that Muslim victimhood across the world is a direct result of a “Crusader” conspiracy against the ummah. Ultimately, the response to the ideas peddled by such narratives is to fight back, to engage in jihad. It is not difficult to see why this might be appealing to the young and disenfranchised.
On top of narratives, every social movement needs a strong leader. If we take IS, which is almost certainly the most threatening jihadist group that we have ever faced, it revolves around the cult of personality associated with its self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Time and time again, we are bombarded with his image, while many IS supporters use screen grabs from his Mosul khutba as their Twitter profile pictures.
These are all further entrenched and popularised through iconographic prowess. With jihadist groups, the symbolism of choice is a black flag with the shahada written in white across it, a throwback to the Abbasid rebellion against the Umayyads. It has tenuous theological foundations and has only recently re-emerged from obscurity thanks to Hizb ut-Tahrir, which revived its use in 1953 when it was founded. As such, to refer to it as a “flag of Islam” is a grave misapprehension. Just like Islamism, it is a manipulation.
At the peak of all this and, indeed, the workings of all social movements, is an end goal. Islamism is no different. The ultimate objective of all Islamists is the desire to right the wrongs faced by Muslims throughout the world and to unite them under one leader, the caliph. Again, we can refer to IS for an example of this. Indeed, one of the things that makes it so appealing to extremists is the fact that it has made tangible progress towards these goals. Its propaganda is rife with references to its shattering of the imperial borders laid down by the Sykes–Picot Agreement.
It is a confluence of the above factors that has long made Islamist groups outrun any liberal or secular group. This is because Islamists form social movements, tightly bound by a set of ideas and symbols, instead of being a loose coalition with a limited aim of removing a dictator. Indeed, the biggest issue for the non-Islamists is that they have little idea of what would come next, after the dictator is ousted.
Ill-equipped and with no centrifugal force to bind them together, anti-authoritarian secularists are always bound to fail. The mechanisms that make a group of people a movement are absent, and thus the building blocks for democracy — ideas, narratives, leaders, iconography and end goals — were not there either. This is where we need to start again.
This does not mean establishing new political parties that appeal more to the youth of the region, nor is it simply a question of tackling the cronyism and corruption that is so endemic to Middle Eastern politics. No, what we need instead is a movement to emerge, something that crosses borders and demographics, a desire for change that it is deeper than loose coalitions of like-minded individuals.
We must help people in the region to correct this situation. We need to incubate and foster what is already there, help catalyze the formation of a social movement that seeks to spread a secular democratic ideal using — just like the Islamists do so successfully — ideas, narratives, leaders and goals. The trans-regional desire to remove despotism from the face of Middle Eastern politics must be harnessed. Perhaps, this could one day come in the form of a regional union based on principles of economic prosperity, freedom of religion and collective security. Certainly, there is a long way to go before this is possible, but the hope for something else, something secular, needs to be invigorated.
What the Middle East needs right now is a secular force that dreams a secular dream. At the moment, the only “dream” is the caliphate. It cannot continue without competition, though.
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